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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Randall entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of trafficking in marijuana
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Randall asserts that his
detention was unlawfully extended to allow a drug detection dog, "Bingo," to sniff his vehicle.
Trooper Tyler Scheierman abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop when, absent reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, he began questioning Mr. Randall about whether there
were drugs in the car. He then instructed Mr. Randall to stand on the side of the road, led his
drug detection dog, Bingo, to the driver's side door and then helped the dog through the open
window. Without the boost from Trooper Scheierman, Bingo would not have been able to enter
Mr. Randall's car through the window. Once inside the car, Bingo alerted. Mr. Randall also
asserts that Bingo's entry into the open car window prior to any probable cause, and facilitated
by Trooper Scheierman, was an unlawful Fourth Amendment search and the evidence gathered
should be suppressed.
Further, Mr. Randall was sentenced to a term of seven years, with three years fixed. On
appeal, Mr. Randall contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district court's
discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 3, 2017, at approximately eight thirty in the morning, the rental car driven
by Mr. Randall was observed traveling on the interstate at approximately 80 miles per hour.
(1/25/18 Tr., p.19, L.7 - p.20, L.5; R., p.113.) The trooper noticed that the car slowed down
upon seeing the marked patrol car and believed the driver was "sitting in a very rigid,
uncomfortable, unnatural driving position, and pressing himself backwards in his seat .... "
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(1/25/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.6-25; R., pp.113, 116.) At that point, Trooper Tyler Scheierman decided to
follow the car. (1/25/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-24; R., pp.113, 116.) Once he saw Mr. Randall change
lanes without signaling for the requisite five seconds, he pulled the car over. (1/25/18 Tr., p.22,
L.6 - p.24, L.10; R., pp.113, 116-17.)
Trooper Scheierman spoke to Mr. Randall and learned that the car was a rental and that
he was driving from Nevada to Minnesota. (1/25/18 Tr., p.24, L.21 - p.27, L.5; R., p.119.)
After learning that Mr. Randall had paid only $75.00 to fly to Las Vegas, but over $500.00 to
rent the car, Trooper Scheierman became suspicious of Mr. Randall's reasons for travel.
(1/25/18 Tr., p.24, Ls.6-19; R., pp.114, 119.) He thought it made "no sense to me to fly out, and
then drive back, especially i[f] it's so much cheaper to fly." 1 (1/25/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.9-19.) He
also noticed Mr. Randall's hands were shaking, his carotid artery was pulsating, and the car had
a "lived-in" look. (1/25/18 Tr., p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.7; R., pp.114, 119.) He asked Mr. Randall
to step out of the car, and he checked the validity of Mr. Randall's driver's license and looked to
see if there were any warrants. (1/25/18 Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.29, L.1; R., p.114.) While awaiting
these results, Trooper Scheierman asked Mr. Randall if he had been further west than Las Vegas
during his trip.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.29, L.5 - p.30, L.4; R., p.119; Exh. 1: 8:39:50-8:40:05. 2)

Mr. Randall paused in thought, and said he had also gone to Reno. (1/25/18 Tr., p.29, L.10 p.30, L.4; R., p.119; Exh. 1: 8:39:50-8:40:05.)

After Mr. Randall's driver's license and

insurance came back "current and clear," Trooper Scheierman abandoned the purpose of the
traffic stop and began a drug investigation.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.28, L.14 - p.31, L.14; Exh. 1:

1

In the dashboard-camera video, Mr. Randall explained that he was planning to make several
stops on his road trip back to Minnesota, including Yellowstone National Park. (Exh. 1: 8:36:518:38:01.)
2
State's Exhibit 1 to the January 25, 2018 Suppression Hearing is attached to Mr. Randall's
Motion to Augment, filed on October 31, 2019. Throughout Mr. Randall's Appellate Brief the
exhibit shall be referred to as "Exh. 1."
2

8:39:24.)

He questioned Mr. Randall about drug trafficking.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.31, Ls.6-14;

R., p.114.)
Trooper Scheierman had a dog, Bingo, with him.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.32, Ls.14-25;

R., p.115.) He asked Mr. Randall ifhe could run his drug detection K-9 around the car. (1/25/18
Tr., p.31, Ls.22-24; R., p.115.) Mr. Randall said he did not mind if that happened "around the
car." (1/25/18 Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32, L.2; R., pp.115, 123.) Before he ran the dog around the
vehicle, Trooper Scheierman pat-searched Mr. Randall against the hood of the police car to
ensure both the officer's and the dog's safety when the dog ran around the car.

(1/25/18

Tr., p.35, Ls.7-17 2; Exhibit 1: 8:41:50-8:42:18; R., p.115.)
Trooper Scheierman began the sniff by walking the leashed dog over to the open driver's
side window.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.8; Exh. 1: 8:43:40.)

Bingo, a "passive

indicator,"3 immediately tried to jump into the car through the open driver's side window.
(R., p.123; Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.) The dog almost did not make the jump and was "boosted" up by
Trooper Scheierman. (1/25/18 Tr., p.68, L.6 - p.69, L.4; R., p.123; Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.) Once
inside the car, it alerted. (1/25/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.10-19; R., p.124.) Trooper Scheierman found
duffel bags containing marijuana in the trunk of the vehicle. (1/25/18 Tr., p.39, Ls.8-13.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. Randall
committed the crime of trafficking in marijuana in the amount of 25 pounds or more. (R., pp.4748.) Thereafter, Mr. Randall filed a Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.59-61.) He asserted that the
evidence gathered against him should be suppressed because the traffic stop was unsupported by
reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause and the traffic stop was unlawfully expanded,
both in duration and scope. (R., pp.59-61.) A hearing was held on the motion. (R., pp.67-70;

3

Bingo's final response or indication is a sit or lay down. (1/25/18 Tr., p.34, L.22 -p.35, L.1.)
3

Tr. 1/25/18.)

Both parties submitted post-hearing briefing, pursuant to the district court's

request. (R., pp.68, 71-111.)
The district court found that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop
showed there were specific and articulable facts that provided the reasonable suspicion necessary
for the investigative detention of Mr. Randall. (R., pp.112-25.) The court concluded:
For example, the Defendant appeared nervous and shaking. His travel plans were
also suspicious and confusing based upon the Defendant's statements that he had
taken a $75.00 flight to Las Vegas and then spent over $500.00 to rent a car to
drive home to Minnesota. The Defendant also exhibited nervousness and changed
his answer when questioned about whether he had visited anywhere else during
his trip to Las Vegas.
(R., p.120.) The court ruled that Trooper Scheierman, during the course of a lawful stop and
based upon the totality of the circumstances, "gained the reasonable suspicion necessary to
expand the initial detention to a drug investigation." (R., pp.122-23.) The district court wrote
that when Trooper Scheierman asked Mr. Randall if he would allow his drug dog to sniff around
the vehicle, Mr. Randall "stated that he did not mind if that happened." (R., p.123.) The district
court acknowledged that the use of the drug dog may not lengthen the duration of the stop absent
reasonable articulable suspicion, but concluded that in Mr. Randall's case, "there is nothing to
indicate the detention lasted longer than necessary to satisfy the conditions of the investigative
seizure." (R., pp.121-24.)
As for Mr. Randall's challenge to the lawfulness of the dog search, the district court held
that the sniff search of the interior of the vehicle did not violate Mr. Randall's Fourth
Amendment rights.

(R., pp.120-24.)

The court reasoned, "absent police misconduct, the

instinctive actions of trained drug dogs do not expand the scope of an otherwise legal dog sniff'
to an unlawful search. (R., pp.120-22.) The district court defined the term "instinctive" to mean
"that a dog enters a car without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler.
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(R., p.122.)

Although the district court acknowledged that Trooper Scheierman's dog

immediately went to the driver's side window and tried to jump inside and the Trooper "assisted
the dog further into the vehicle to prevent injury to the animal and the car," the court found
"Trooper Scheierman's drug dog made independent entry into the Defendant's car because the
dog detected an odor emanating from the vehicle." (R., p.123.) The court held that "Trooper
Scheierman did nothing to initiate the dog's entry into the vehicle," thus, "his reliable drugdetection dog instinctively and without police misconduct indicated the presence of controlled
substance inside that vehicle." (R., p.124.)
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Randall's motion to suppress, finding that the
initial stop was lawful, the trooper had reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug trafficking such
that a drug investigation was permissible, and the canine search was not violative of
Mr. Randall's Fourth Amendment rights because Bingo "instinctively and without police
misconduct" alerted to the presence of narcotics and that alert gave the trooper probable cause to
search the interior of the vehicle. (R., pp.112-25.)
Mr. Randall entered a conditional guilty plea to a reduced charge of trafficking under 25
pounds of marijuana, preserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
(12/3/18 Tr., p.85, L.11 - p.87, L.4; p.92, Ls.2-23; R., pp.139-49.)

Two months later,

Mr. Randall was sentenced. The State requested a sentence of seven years, with three years
fixed. (2/11/19 Tr., p.107, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Randall's defense counsel asked the district court to
sentence him to the mandatory minimum of three years. (2/11/19 Tr., p.107, Ls.16-17; p.111,
Ls.12-13.) The district court sentenced him to a unified term of seven years, with three years
fixed. (2/11/19 Tr., p.115, Ls.2-15; R., pp.160-63.) Mr. Randall filed a Notice of Appeal timely
from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.164-68, 179-83.)

5

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Randall's motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Randall following his plea of guilty to trafficking
in marijuana?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Randall's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Randall asserts that Trooper Scheierman did not have a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity to prolong the traffic stop for the dog sniff. At best, Trooper Scheierman had a
mere hunch, which is insufficient to justify the prolonged stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Further, Trooper Scheierman's facilitation of Bingo's trespass and search into the interior of the
car, before the establishment of probable cause, was an unlawful search. Due to the unlawfully
prolonged stop and the dog's unlawful search, Mr. Randall submits that the district court should
have granted his motion to suppress. Mr. Randall's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated.

B.

Relevant Jurisprudence And Standards Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 571 (Ct.
App. 2014 ). The Court exercises free review of "the trial court's application of constitutional
principles to the facts found."

Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

Determinations of reasonable

suspicion are reviewed de nova. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013) (citing State v.

Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127 (2010)).
When reviewing the district court's determination ofreasonable suspicion, "the appellate
court 'should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
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officers."' Id. (quoting Munoz, 149 Idaho at 127). "The Court accepts the trial court's findings
of fact if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The
Court "has defined 'substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance."' Id.
(quoting Evans v. Hara 's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478 (1993)). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." Hunter, 156 Idaho at 570.

C.

Trooper Scheierman Did Not Have The Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Necessary To
Expand The Initial Traffic Stop To A Drug Investigation
"[ A]n officer may stop a vehicle to investigate if there is a reasonable and articulable

suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." State v. Edwards, 158 Idaho
323, 324 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v.
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208 (Ct. App. 1998)).

Mr. Randall does not challenge Trooper

Scheierman's initial stop of the vehicle based on his failure to adequately signal his lane change.
"A drug dog sniff may be performed during a traffic stop without violating the Fourth
Amendment if the duration of the stop is not extended or if any extension of the stop is justified
by reasonable suspicion." State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424 (Ct. App. 2015). As the United
States Supreme Court recently held, "An officer ... may conduct certain unrelated checks during
an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . , he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop,
absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual."
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). In contrast to the ordinary inquiries

incident to a traffic stop, a dog sniff "is a measure aimed at 'detect[ing] evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.

8

32, 40--41 (2000)). Therefore, a dog sniff cannot prolong the stop absent reasonable suspicion
because a dog sniff "is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's mission" during a routine
traffic stop. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
"must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis added). The Brown Court went on to note "we have required
the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity." Id. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts considered with objective and reasonable inferences that form a basis for particularized
suspicion. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983-84 (Ct. App. 2003). Particularized suspicion
consists of two elements: (1) the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances,
and (2) the determination must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
"An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training." State v.
Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). However, the officer "must be able to articulate

more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion' or 'hunch' of criminal activity."
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sako/ow, 490 U.S.

1, 7 (1989)). "The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112.
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The scope of the search or se12ure must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 28-29
(1968). The scope of the investigative detention "must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
Consequently, where the person is detained in a prolonged traffic stop, the scope of that
detention must carefully tailored to its underlying justification: the officer's reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.

The officer must have a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal

activity if the stop is prolonged specifically for the purpose of deploying a dog to detect the odor
of drugs. To allow a dog sniff without a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity
would be an unreasonable expansion of the justification for the seizure. See State v. Aguirre, 141
Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by officers prolonging stop for a dog sniff without reasonable suspicion of a "drugrelated offense").
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rodriguez holds "that a police stop
exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id. at 1612. In so finding, the Rodriguez
Court made clear that it was adhering to the line drawn in its prior decision in Illinois v.
Caballes.

Id; see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that a lawful seizure

justified only by a traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the purpose of issuing a ticket for the violation).
In analyzing the issue, the United States Supreme Court explained: "Like a Terry stop,
the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's
'mission'-to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety
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concerns." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court reiterated that "[b ]ecause addressing the
infraction is the purpose of the stop, [the detention] may 'last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate th[ at] purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the infraction
are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court
recognized that an officer "may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful
stop. But ... he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop absent the reasonable suspicion
ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Rodriguez, "[t]he Government argue[d] that an officer may 'incremental[ly]' prolong a
stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the trafficrelated purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to
the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances." Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015). However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument:
The Government's argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related
tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal
investigation. The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the
police in fact do. . . . If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries
expeditiously, then that is the amount of "time reasonably required to complete
[the stop's] mission." As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic stop
"pro longed beyond" that point is "unlawful." The critical question then, is not
whether the dog sniff occurs before the officer issues a ticket, ... but whether
conducting the sniff "prolongs"-i.e., adds time to-"the stop .... "

Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the district court concluded that "Trooper Scheierman gained the reasonable
suspicion necessary to expand the initial detention to a drug investigation." (R., pp.122-23.) The
district court reasoned:
[T]he totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the Defendant's
vehicle show there were specific and articulable facts that justify the reasonable
suspicion necessary to permit the investigative detention of the Defendant. For
example, the Defendant appeared nervous and shaking. His travel plans were also
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suspicious and confusing based upon the Defendant's statements that he had taken
a $75.00 flight to Las Vegas and then spent over $500.00 to rent a car to drive
home to Minnesota. The Defendant also exhibited nervousness and changed his
answer when questioned about whether he had visited anywhere else during his
trip to Las Vegas.
(R., p.120.) However, these facts, even when considered in totality, support only a hunch.
The facts of this case are startlingly similar to those in State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761
(Ct. App. 2016). In Kelley, the officer stopped the car after seeing the driver cross the centerline.

Id. 160 Idaho at 762. The officer had a drug detection canine in his patrol car. Id. Mr. Kelley

provided his driver's license and registration, although the car was owned by a third party. Id.
The officer found Mr. Kelley to have a nervous demeanor-avoiding eye contact, trembling, and
a pulsating artery. Id. Based on Mr. Kelley's nervousness, the officer ordered a backup unit.
Kelley, 160 Idaho at 762. While waiting for dispatch, the officer approached Mr. Kelley a

second time and questioned him further about the car's owner and Mr. Kelley's travel plans. Id.
Mr. Kelley said the car belonged to his friend and he was driving from Oregon to Nebraska to
return the car. Id. The officer learned that Mr. Kelley was "clear and valid-no warrants." Id.
The third time the officer approached Mr. Kelley's car he asked if there was anything illegal in
the vehicle, if there were drugs or drug paraphernalia in the vehicle and if Mr. Kelley would be
willing to consent to a search of the vehicle. Id. Mr. Kelley responded "no" to each question.
Id. It was at that time that the backup unit arrived, and the assisting officers detained Mr. Kelley

on the side of the road while the arresting officer ran the dog around the outside of Mr. Kelley's
car. Id.
Mr. Kelley moved to suppress the evidence located after the dog alerted on the trunk of
the car, alleging that the officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. Kelley, 160 Idaho at 762.
The district court denied the motion, ruling that the officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong
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the stop. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "none of the circumstances that
occurred before and during the officer's second approach justified the officer's suspicion that
Kelley was involved in criminal activity." Id. 160 Idaho at 764. The Court held:
The officer did not testify to any facts connecting Kelley's nervous behavior with
criminal activity. Likewise, the officer did not testify to any objective facts
linking Kelley's unusual travel plans to drug activity. The only fact linking drug
activity to Kelley was that he was driving on the same road others have used to
transport drugs. The use of a commonly traveled road does not give an officer
reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop. The officer's suspicion that
Kelley's route from Oregon to Nebraska was somehow related to drug activity
was nothing more than a hunch. Thus, the information available to the officer
prior to his second encounter with Kelley was insufficient to create reasonable
suspicion to justify the prolonged stop.
Id. Like the facts in Kelley, Mr. Randall's nervousness, travel plans, and beating artery do not

equate to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. The car's "lived-in" look and an unconventional
travel itinerary, or increased nervousness when asked additional questions about the areas
traveled to, are not objective facts linking the travel plans or increased nervousness to drug
activity. In fact, there are no objective facts linking Mr. Randall to drug activity at all, unlike the
circumstances of Kelley where Mr. Kelley was driving on a road others had used for transporting
drugs. Kelley, 160 Idaho at 764.
Nervous behavior, standing alone, is insufficient for reasonable suspicion. See United
States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that no circuit court has

held that nervousness alone suffices for reasonable suspicion and holding that even extreme
nervousness alone does not support reasonable suspicion), amended by United States v. ChavezValenzuela, 279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Muehler v. Mena, 544

U.S. 93 (2005).

A person's nervous behavior during a police encounter is of "limited

significance" to establish reasonable suspicion "because it is common for people to exhibit signs
of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity." State v.
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Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86 (Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710
(Ct. App. 2016) (noting that "lawful, albeit unusual, conduct" is insufficient, standing alone, for
reasonable suspicion). Mr. Randall's nervous behavior, in and of itself, does not create a
reasonable suspicion that he had committed or was about to commit a drug-related crime.
The other circumstances known to Trooper Scheierman at the time do not establish a
reasonable suspicion to justify the prolonged stop. Similar to nervousness, the "confusing travel
plans" finding 4 also is of little significance. This is not a "specific, articulable" fact or rational
inference thereof on which to base a determination of reasonable suspicion. See Morgan, 154
Idaho at 112. A driver's nervous behavior during an initial police encounter coupled with a
rental vehicle traveling on an interstate while on a long road trip is insufficient for a reasonable
suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. Moreover, none of the other relevant facts support a
determination of reasonable suspicion. Trooper Scheierman did not smell the odor of marijuana
during the encounter or see any items of drug paraphernalia. (1/25/18 Tr., p.50, L.5 - p.51, L.7.)
Mr. Randall complied with Trooper Scheierman's requests for his driver's license and rental
agreement. (1/25/18 Tr., p.26, Ls.2-22.) The vehicle was a rental car and everything was in
order regarding the rental of the car. (1/25/18 Tr., p.55, L.20 - p.56, L.3.)
It is undisputed that Trooper Scheierman extended the duration of the traffic stop to

conduct a drug investigation. (1/25/18 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-15; p.57, L.7 - p.58, L.5; R., p.119.)
Because Trooper Scheierman prolonged the traffic stop for an unrelated purpose, a drug
investigation, that investigation must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564. In light of the
totality of the circumstances, the information known to Trooper Scheierman prior to the second

4

Mr. Randall assumes in arguendo that this finding is supported by the record.
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encounter does not create a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to justify the
prolonged stop.

D.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Randall's Motion To Suppress Because The
Dog's Entry Into The Interior Of Mr. Randall's Car Absent Probable Cause Constituted
An Unlawful Search Where That Entry Was Facilitated By Trooper Scheierman
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 17 of the

Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const.
Art. I, § 17. Thus, a warrant is generally required before law enforcement may conduct a search.
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to
demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Martinez,
129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, "searches and
seizures 'conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions."' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)
(quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)).
Under the "automobile exception," the police may search a car when they have probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982); State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 175 (Ct. App. 2015). When a
reliable drug-detection dog alerts on the exterior of a lawfully stopped car, police have probable
cause to believe that there are drugs in the car and may search it without a warrant. Id.; State v.
Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843 (1999). However, the interior of a vehicle has heightened protection.
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When law enforcement deploys police dogs into protected, private areas it is a Fourth
Amendment search.

Under United States Supreme Court precedent, a drug dog's physical

intrusion upon a home's curtilage is a search. In Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), the
United States Supreme Court held that the use of a drug dog on a home's curtilage constituted a
search. The Court stated "One virtue of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that
it keeps easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding
on Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred." Id. at
1417-18.
Similarly, in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the Court held that installing a
GPS device on a citizen's private vehicle constituted a search. Id. at 949. It said that "It is
important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted." Id. Thus, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test originating from
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), "has been added to, not substituted for, the common-

law trespassory test." Jones, 565 U.S. at 409. Jones and Jardine strongly support a rule that a
drug dog's entry into a vehicle, for any reason, prior to the establishment of probable cause, is an
unconstitutional search.
When a drug-sniffing dog infringes upon a "constitutionally protected interest in privacy"
by entering a car before probable cause is established, an unlawful search has occurred. See
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (holding that a dog sniff performed "on the

exterior of respondent's car" was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment and noting "unless
the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy.") As a
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general rule, "[a] dog sniff along the outside of a motor vehicle does not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (emphasis added)).

Once an officer has

stopped a vehicle, a subsequent investigation "can ripen into probable cause as soon as a drug
detection dog alerts on the exterior of the vehicle, justifying a search of the vehicle without the
necessity of a warrant" based on the automobile exception. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843
(1999) (citing State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1992) (emphasis added). A dog's alert on
the outside can provide the probable cause necessary to overcome the requirement of a warrant
to search the inside.
Based on United States Supreme Court precedent, the driver of a vehicle enJoys an
expectation of privacy in the contents of a vehicle, and a vehicle is a piece of property that is
protected against trespass. If there is an odor and an alert outside a vehicle, a dog sniff of the
interior can be constitutional. If a dog enters a vehicle, for any reason, including instinct, prior to
the establishment of probable cause, United States Supreme Court precedent indicates that is an
unconstitutional search.

1.

Because Bingo Was Boosted Into Mr. Randall's Car And Did Not Obtain Entry
Without Assistance His Entry Constituted A Warrantless Search

Courts in some jurisdictions have held that a dog's entry into the interior of a vehicle
during a canine sniff was not a search unless there was evidence that the handler facilitated or
encouraged the dog's entry into the vehicle. See United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 620 (6th
Cir. 2012) (no search when dog jumped through open window without facilitation by police);
United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2010) (no search when, without

facilitation by police, dog entered car door opened by defendant); United States v. Lyons, 486
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F.3d 367, 373-74 (8th Cir. 2007) (no search when, without facilitation by police, dog's head
entered window opened by passenger); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir.
1989) (no search when dog jumped in hatchback that was not opened to permit dog to enter and
police did not encourage entry); United States v. Hutchinson, 471 F.Supp.2d 497, 510-11 (M. D.
Pa. 2007) (no search where dog entered car window that police did not open and police did not
encourage entry); cf United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (search
where police opened van door, unleashed dog as he neared the door, and the dog entered the
van).
The issue of when a dog's entry into the open window of a vehicle constitutes an
unlawful search has recently been addressed in Idaho. In State v. Naranjo, the Court of Appeals
recognized the circumstances under which a drug dog may enter and sniff the interior of a
vehicle absent probable cause.

159 Idaho 258, 260 (Ct. App. 2015). Although most of the

federal cases the Naranjo Court was relying on were cases in which the dog had alerted to the
vehicle's exterior prior to the interior entry, the Naranjo Court held, "We do not believe a drug
dog's behavior before entering a vehicle is constitutionally significant." Id. The Naranjo Court
determined that the applicable inquiry is whether a dog's entry into a car was "instinctual" and
not the result of handler facilitation. Id.; see also State v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 212-14 (3d Cir.
2010).

The Naranjo Court concluded that the relevant case law held "that absent police

misconduct, the instinctive actions of trained drug dogs do not expand the scope of an otherwise
legal dog sniff to an impermissible search without a warrant or probable cause." Id.
It is undisputed that Bingo's alert occurred after his warrantless entry into Mr. Randall's

car. (R., p.123.) Because the dog did not indicate the presence of narcotics while outside the
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car, this was not a search based on probable cause. Thus, under Naranjo, the relevant inquiry is
whether Trooper Scheierman facilitated the dog's entry into Mr. Randall's car.
In this case, it is clear in the trooper's dash-camera video that Trooper Scheierman
walked the dog directly over to the open driver's side window. (Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.) And then,
when the dog only jumped halfway up, he boosted the dog in through the window. (Exh. 1:
8:43:40-43.) It is clear from his position that he anticipated the dog would enter through the
open window, which it did, because he positioned the dog directly in front of the driver's side.
(Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.) The dog probably would not have made the jump without the boost from
Trooper Scheierman. (Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.) Trooper Scheierman testified that he helped the dog
in when the dog got stuck in the window area, "He was about halfway in, and, yes, to prevent
injury or whatever, I did boost him in." (1/25/18 Tr., p.68, Ls.10-15.) He then backtracked and
pointed out that he did not pick the dog up and put him inside the car-"the term 'boost' is kind
ofa hot button topic right now. So I didn't boost him." (1/25/18 Tr., p.68, Ls.17-25.) Trooper
Scheierman "helped him get all the way in because he kind of got hung up on the [way in]."
(1/25/18 Tr., p.69, Ls.1-4.)
The district court acknowledged that, absent probable cause, it would be an unlawful
search if the officer facilitated the dog's entry into Mr. Randall's car before the dog had detected
the presence of contraband.

(R., p.122.)

Yet the district court found that the dog "made

independent entry into the Defendant's car because the dog detected an odor emanating from the
vehicle." (R., pp.122-23.) The district court concluded "Trooper Scheierman did nothing to
initiate the dog's entry into the vehicle."

(R., p.124.)

This finding was erroneous.

The

dashboard-camera video, Exhibit 1, shows Trooper Scheierman leading the dog to the location
and boosting the dog into the car through the open window.
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Under Naranjo, whether the handler facilitated or assisted the dog's entry into the interior
of the vehicle must be analyzed to determine the lawfulness of the dog's entry. See also State v.
Warsaw, 956 P.2d 139, 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (distinguishing Stone 5 and Watson, 6 noting

that "Officer Williams reached into the trunk to remove the glass-laden carpet because he
expected the dog to jump in there. [The dog], under the preparation, guidance, and stimulation of
Officer Williams, jumped into the open trunk"); United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328,
1331 (10th Cir. 1998) ("A desire to facilitate a dog sniff of the van's interior, absent in Stone,
seems readily apparent here"); State v. Freel, 32 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that the officer "encouraged the dog to enter into the car when it had not alerted on the exterior").
That is exactly what occurred here.

Trooper Scheierman discovered the evidence in

Mr. Randall's car only as a result of facilitating Bingo's physical intrusion into Mr. Randall's
car. Bingo had not indicated when the trooper boosted him through the car window. (Exh. 1 at
8:43:40.) In fact, he had not even been run around the exterior of the vehicle before he was
boosted through the open car window.

(Exh. 1 at 8:43:39-41.) Bingo was on a leash and

certainly could have been prevented from entering the car. (See Exh. 1: 8:43:40.) Based on
United States Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that the driver of a vehicle retains an
expectation of privacy in a vehicle's contents, and a vehicle is considered a piece of property that
is protected against trespass. 7 Although the Idaho Court of Appeals, in Naranjo, held that an

5

United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 364 (10th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Watson, 783 F.2d 258, 265 (E.D. Va. 1992).
7
In the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2013), a drug dog
"jumped up and placed his paws on the vehicle and pressed his nose against Thomas's toolbox."
Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit said that "The government claims that it is frivolous for Thomas
to contend that the dog's contact with his truck was a Fourth Amendment search. After Jones
and Jardines, his argument cannot be so easily dismissed." Id. at 1092. The Ninth Circuit did
not address the merits of this issue because it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply due to
the good faith exception. Id. at 1093.
6
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instinctual8 leap into a vehicle is not an unlawful search so long as it is not facilitated by the
handler, in this case Trooper Scheierman facilitated the dog's entry into the interior of
Mr. Randall's car. Therefore, the trooper's actions to facilitate Bingo's trespass and search into
the interior of the car resulted in an unlawful search.

2.

The District Court Lacked Substantial And Competent Evidence For Its Finding
That Bingo Smelled Narcotics So "Instinctively" Tried To Jump Through The
Window

One of the facts that contributed to the district court's conclusion that the drug sniff of the
interior of the car did not violate Mr. Randall's Fourth Amendment rights was the court's
conclusion that the "drug dog made independent entry into the Defendant's car because the dog
detected an odor emanating from the vehicle." (R., pp.120-23.) The finding is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record. The entirety of Trooper Scheierman's
testimony on this subject provides:
Q. [By the prosecutor] And upon retrieving or removing K-9 Bingo out of your
vehicle, how did you go about conducting the sniff?
A. Put Bingo on leash, and he walked me, basically, up to the car. I was supposed
to walk him, but he walked me because - but, yeah, he went to the - and then
went to the car, the suspect car.

Q. And what did he do when he got to the vehicle?

8

As a commentator on this issue has noted, "[g]iven the extensive training which canine teams
complete to become detectors of contraband, it seems reasonable to expect that the dogs could be
conditioned to resist the urge (instinctive or otherwise) to leap into a vehicle without clear
instruction from their handlers." Brian R. Dempsey, Canine Constables and the Fourth
Amendment, Fed. Law., June 2013, at 40, 42. Mr. Dempsey discussed the opinions in Sharp et.
al. and said "by distinguishing between vehicle incursions that were caused by canine instinct
and those which were encouraged by their handlers, these courts seemingly injected a subjective
element into the Fourth Amendment analysis," which the United States Supreme Court has
warned should "play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis .... " Id.
quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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A. He went to the driver's side of the vehicle. He put his front paws up onto the
front driver's side window, which was open, and I noticed Bingo paused briefly
as he was sniffing, and then propelled himself inside of that open window.

(1/25/18 Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.12.) In light of this brief testimony, the district court's factual
finding that Bingo "made independent entry" through the driver's side window "because the dog
detected an odor emanating from the vehicle" is in error. 9 (R., pp.120-23.) There was no
testimony or evidence as to why the dog jumped through the window. (See 1/25/18 Tr.) Where
there are numerous reasons why a dog might try to enter a car through a window, including
because it was trained to enter a vehicle whenever possible, the district court's finding was not
based on substantial and competent evidence.

Further, it is clear that he immediately went

through the window due to the preparation and guidance of Trooper Scheierman. Bingo was led
to the location the trooper wanted him to search and then his entry was substantially assisted by
his handler. (See Exh. 1: 8:43:40-43.)
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Randall asserts that his continued detention was
unreasonable and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Randall asserts that the discovery of the evidence used
against him was the product of his illegal detention and unlawful search of his vehicle and should
have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Randall asserts that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his motion to suppress.

9

Essentially, the court held that what is found after an entry justifies the entry. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that one of the most basic tenets of Fourth
Amendment law is that "[a] search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful
by what it brings to light" and such a "doctrine has never been recognized by this court, nor can
it be tolerated under our constitutional system .... " Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29
(1927); see also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Randall Following His Plea Of Guilty To Trafficking
Marijuana
Mr. Randall asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of seven years,
with three years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). The
Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant
has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,
577 (1979)). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
Mr. Randall does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision by the exercise of reason, Mr. Randall must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho
141, 145 (1991).

The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

"(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
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of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing." Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978).
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Randall's sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
As Mr. Randall explained:
Well, Your Honor, this is -- the biggest mistake that I've ever made. This is the
worst decision. Like Mr. Pacyga said, I had no idea about the broader scope of
how this affects communities. I was very -- extremely nai:Ve about it. I -- I
realize, you know, that although I'm nonviolent, as a nonviolent person, that a lot
of bad things happened around drug trafficking.
I realize that, you know, that the cost to the state of Idaho is paid by the people of
Idaho to enforce this -- is -- is increased by people doing what I did. There's
more potential -- it brings more potential for violence. I mean, sixty-five pounds
is a lot, and I didn't -- I wasn't worried about getting robbed or anything, but I
know that that happens. I know that violence does occur because of it, drug
trafficking.
I endangered people that I didn't even know. It's dangerous for officers. And I
wish I had never done it.
Yeah, my mother and my older sister are here with me today, and I -- I deeply
regret the pain that I have caused them and the rest of my family, and the same is
true for my friends in my community. I have a great community. A very strong,
loving family. I'm the youngest of five and -- it's a horrible decision.
It's -- this has been the most difficult situation in my life. And looking back at it
now, for fast money, it's ridiculous the idea of the concept that I even though that
was okay.
I can't undo what's been done, but I can do my best moving forward to impact,
get back into my community, and get back into my family, and be there for them.
I'm not going to be there for -- my dad is a veteran with MS and mostly in a
wheelchair, and it's just him and my mom at home, and I have been the one to be
there to work with them and take care of them. My grandmother -- I work for
myself, so if somebody needed something, I could -- I could get off work, and I
could go do what needed to be done.
So all of these things that I have been able to do, I'm not going to be able to do
because I went after fast money. When I get out, I've had a huge outpouring of
support from all of my friends and family to get through this, and I'm very
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confident that when I get out, that I'll be able to get that house and that land and
those things that I want without having to touch anything. And I have zero desire
to do anything that would possibly get me one day further in any jail anywhere or
in any trouble or cause any of these people that I have hurt any more pain. Thank
you.
(2/11/19 Tr., p.111, L. 17 - p.113, L.24.)
Mr. Randall does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Randall's mother and sister were present in the courtroom to support him during his
sentencing hearing. (2/11/19 Tr., p.109, Ls.22-23; p.112, Ls.13-14.) Mr. Randall also has a
strong relationship with his
Support,

10

grandmother, for whom he helps to care for. (Letters of

pp.6-7; 2/11/19 Tr., p.109, L.23 - p.110, L.13.) Mr. Randall received nine letters of

support from family members and friends in Minnesota. (Letters of Support, pp.4-9.)
Further, Mr. Randall expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(2/11/19 Tr., p.111, L.17 - p.113, L.24.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).

Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Randall asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse and his family support it would have imposed a less severe
sentence.

10

The electronic file "Letters of Support" contains a Certificate of Exhibits and nine letters
submitted to the district court in support of Mr. Randall.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Randall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. Alternatively,
Mr. Randall respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or
remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 31 st day of October, 2019.
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